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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The lit: al 1 Court o f A p p e a 1 s 1 las j i iri sdi ct i o n ove i t: 1 le ins t: ant
appeal p u r s u a n t to U t a h Code A n n . § 7 8 - 2 a - 3 ( 2 ) (f) .

S T A T E M E N T OF ISSUES , STANDARDS U E R E V I E W
1.

W h e t h e r a trial c o u r t , b y f a i l i n g t o a l l o w a n a c c u s e d

to b e p r e s e n t d u r i n g a c o m m u n i c a t i o n betweei i t h e j u d g e ai id j i ii: y ,
denied the accused of the constitutional right to be present at
all stages of the trial.

Because this issue was not raised at

trial, due to the trial court's failure to enter the question and
answer into the record, it presents circumstances constituting
plain erroi.

See State

v.

Dunn,

1993); State v. Archambeau,

850 p.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah

820 P. 2d 920, 922-23 (Utah Ct. App.

1991).
A.

Whether Mr. Belt voluntarily,, intentionall y, and

knowingly waived his const: tut:i oi la 1 i ight: to 1: = present
at all stages of the trial.

As stated above, this

issue presents circumstances constituting plain error.
See State v.
State v.

Dunn,

Archambeau,

850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993);
820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah Ct

App.

1991).

B.

W h e t h e r a trial c o u r t , b y f a i l i n g t o a l l o w a n

a c c u s e d to b e p r e s e n t duri i Ig a ::ornmi Ii 3 :i cat:i on between

6

the judge and jury, violates the mandatory language of
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(a), which requires

{

that in all cases the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel.

Inasmuch

as this issue was not raised at trial, due to the trial
court's failure to enter the question and answer into
the record, it presents circumstances constituting
plain error.

See State

(Utah 1993); State

v.

v.

Dunn,

Archambeau,

850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09
820 P.2d 920, 922-23

(Utah Ct. App. 1991) .
2.

I

Whether an accused is denied his constitutional right

to due process by a trial court's failure to enter the question
i

and answer into the record.

Due to the circumstances surrounding

the issue not being raised at trial, the issue is reviewed for
plain error.

See State v. Dunn,

1993); State v. Archambeau,

850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah

820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah Ct. App.

1991).
3.

Whether appointed trial counsel, by failing to object

{

to Mr. Belt's absence during the in-chambers hearing concerning
the jury's note and the proposed communication between the judge
i

and the jury concerning the note deprived Mr. Belt of his
constitutional right to be present in person at all stages of the
trial as well as his rights to due process and the effective
7

{

assistance of counsel.

To make such a showing, Mr. Belt must

show, first, that counsel rendered a deficient performance,
falling below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance was
prejudicial.

Bundy

v.

DeLand,

763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988).

Such

Strickland

v.

claims present mixed questions of law and fact.
Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070 (1984).

When

available, the appellate court defers to the trial court's
findings of fact, but reviews its application of legal principles
to its factual findings for correctness.

State

v.

Hay,

859 P.2d

1, 4-5 (Utah 1993) .

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative,
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a case involving the constitutional right of an
accused to be present at all stages of the trial.

On December

19, 1997, Lynn L. Belt was being held in the Davis County Jail on
charges of possession of a controlled substance and possession of

8

drug paraphernalia.

The charges for which Mr. Belt was being

held were ultimately dismissed due to a lack of evidence.

{

On the morning of December 19, 1997, Mr. Belt and his
cellmate, Mr. Darwin E. Thompson, were both engaged in an
argument.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Thompson hit Mr. Belt first,

after which Mr. Belt hit Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Belt was subsequently charged with Assault by a
Prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-102.5. At trial, Mr. Thompson, who appeared as a witness
on behalf of the State, essentially testified that he could not

<

remember any events surrounding the argument and fight between he
and Mr. Belt.
I
After the jury retired for its deliberations, it apparently
sent a note to the judge with the following inquiry:
Mr. Belt in Jail fore [sic]?"

"What was

Notifying neither counsel nor Mr.

Belt, the judge returned the note to the jury with the following
response or supplemental instruction:
in jail is irrelevant.

"The reason Mr. Belt was

Please proceed with your deliberations

based on the testimony presented in the courtroom."
signed, "Darwin C. Hansen, District Court Judge".

<

The note is
The jury
i

thereafter returned a verdict of guilty as charged.

That same

day, the court sentenced Mr. Belt to an indeterminate term of
(

9
i

zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, after which this
appeal followed.
After the filing of Mr. Belt's Brief of Appellant, the State
filed a motion to supplement the record and to stay the briefing
deadlines.

On July 9, 1999, this Court granted the State's

motion and temporarily remanded the case to the trial court "for
the purpose of entering findings of fact concerning the nature
and content of the judge's discussions with counsel and the jury
concerning the jury's note."
On August 27, 1999, the parties appeared before the trial
court for hearing on the motion to supplement the record.
Thereafter, the trial court's Findings of Fact concerning the
communications with counsel and the jury were entered.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On December 19, 1997, Lynn L. Belt, the Defendant in

the instant case, was being held in the Davis County Jail on
charges of possession of a controlled substance and possession of
drug paraphernalia (See R. 167, Transcript of Preliminary Hearing
Held on May 6, 1998, p. 3, lines 11-15; R. 169, Transcript of
Trial Held on July 17, 1998, Vol. II., p. 259, lines 3-5). x

*Mr. Belt was arrested on December 16, 1997, in the course
of an investigation of a car accident that occurred at
approximately 6:30 that morning (See R. 167, Transcript of
Preliminary Hearing Held on May 6, 1998, p. 4, lines 15-20).
10

2.

The charges for which Mr. Belt was being held were

ultimately dismissed due to a lack of evidence (See R. 169,

{

Transcript of Trial Held on July 17, 1998, Vol. II., p. 255,
lines 18-25, and p. 259, lines 6-11).
3.

On the morning of December 19, 1997, Mr. Belt and his

cellmate, Mr. Darwin E. Thompson, were both engaged in an
argument (See id.
4.

at R. 169, p. 159, lines 16-20, p. 161-62);

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Thompson hit Mr. Belt first,

after which Mr. Belt hit Mr. Thompson (See id.

at R. 169, p. 162(

63) .
5.

Mr. Belt was charged with Assault by a Prisoner, a

third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5
i

(See R. 3, Amended Information).
6.

At trial, Mr. Thompson, who appeared as a witness on

behalf of the State, essentially testified that he could not
remember any events surrounding the argument and fight between he
and Mr. Belt (See R. 168, Transcript of Trial Held July 16, 1998,
Vol. I., p. 82, lines 11-20, p. 83, lines 8-11, pp. 84-85).
7.

{

After the jury retired for its deliberations, it

apparently sent a note to the judge with the following inquiry:
i

"What was Mr. Belt in Jail fore [sic]?" (See R. 92, Note to Judge
from Jury).
i

11

8.

The judge convened an informal hearing in chambers with

the prosecutor, in person, and via cellular telephone with Mr.
Belt's counsel2 (See R. 197-99, Findings of Fact, 1f4) .
9.

Mr. Belt was not present during the informal hearing in

chambers even though he was in a holding cell at the time (See
id.

at f5) .3
10.

The judge dictated a proposed response to the jury's

note, which stated, "The reason Mr. Belt was in jail is
irrelevant.

Please proceed with your deliberations based on the

testimony presented in the courtroom."

(See id.

at \S) . At the

bottom of the note the judge signed the response, "Darwin C.
Hansen, District Court Judge" (See
11.

id.).

Both the prosecutor and counsel for Mr. Belt, who was

not present, agreed that the language and response were
appropriate (See id.
were given (See id.

at flO). No supplemental jury instructions
at 1fll) .

2

During the informal hearing in chambers, the trial court
utilized the speaker phone (See R. 197-99, Findings of Fact, f7).
At the temporary remand hearing, Mr. Belt's counsel recalled
speaking with the judge by way of telephone but she did not
recall knowing that the prosecutor was present with the judge
during the conversation (See id. at f9).
3

The informal hearing held by the judge to discuss the
jury's note was not recorded even though it could have been
recorded by magnetic tape (See R. 197-99, Findings of Fact, f6).
12

12.

The jury thereafter returned a verdict of guilty as

charged (See R. 169, Transcript of Trial Held on July 17, 1998,
Vol. II., p. 247, lines 11-22; R. 93, Verdict);
13.

That same day, the court sentenced Mr. Belt to an

indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison
(See id.

at R. 169, p. 263, lines 15-19; R. 107, Judgment and

Commitment to the Utah State Prison);
14.

Pursuant to an Order granting an extension of time to

file Notice of Appeal, Mr. Belt filed Notice of Appeal on October
19, 1998 (See R. 141-43, Order Granting Motion for Extension of
Time to File Notice of Appeal; R. 144-48, Notice of Appeal).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court in the instant case, by failing to

allow Mr. Belt to be present in person during the discussion of
the proposed communication between the judge and jury, denied
him, as the accused, of the constitutional right to be present at
all stages of the trial.

In the course of precluding Mr. Belt

from being present during the in-chambers hearing concerning the
proposed communication between the judge and jury, the trial
court did not inform Mr. Belt of the substance of the
communication and thereby failed to afford him the opportunity to
be heard before the supplemental charge or response was given to

13

the jury.

Because this issue was not raised at trial, which

failure was due to the trial court's failure to enter the
question and answer into the record, this issue, as well as the
those that follow, present circumstances constituting plain
error.
A.

In light of the circumstances surrounding the

instant case, Mr. Belt did not voluntarily,
intentionally, and knowingly waive his constitutional
right to be present at all stages of the trial.

The

record reveals that the trial court failed to provide
notice to Mr. Belt of the communication received from
the jury and of the proposed supplemental charge or
response to the communication of the jury.
B.

The trial court, by failing to allow Mr. Belt to

be present in person during the improper communication
between the judge and jury, violated the mandatory
language of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 (a),
which requires that in all cases the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel.

In addition, the trial court's failure to

inform Mr. Belt about the improper communication with
the jury violated Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

By failing to enter the question
14

and answer into the record, the trial court violated
Rule 17(m) and thereby failed to provide Mr. Belt the
opportunity to object.
2.

The trial court denied Mr. Belt of his constitutional

right to due process by its failure to enter the question and
answer into the record.

By so doing, the trial court denied Mr.

Belt of the opportunity to object to the supplemental instruction
or response given to the jury without notice to Mr. Belt.
3.

By failing to object to Mr. Belt's absence during the

in-chambers hearing concerning the proposed communication between
the judge and the jury, appointed trial counsel deprived Mr. Belt
of his constitutional right to be present in person at all stages
of the trial as well as his rights to due process and the
effective assistance of counsel.
ARGUMENTS
I.

THE ACCUSED HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE
PRESENT IN PERSON TO DEFEND AT ALL STAGES OF THE
TRIAL•

Article I, section 12, of the Utah Constitution provides as
follows:

right

"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the

to appear and defend

in person

4

and by counsel

. . . . "4

Rule 17(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, also provides
that u[i]n all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel."
15

(Emphasis added); see
1978); State v.
(Utah 1935) .5

Aikers,

also

State

v.

Lee,

585 P.2d 58 n.l (Utah

87 Utah 507, 513, 51 P.2d 1052, 1055

Because this is an important right with both state

and federal constitutional underpinnings,6 see

Illinois

v.

Allen,

397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058 (1970) ("One of the most
basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the
accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of
his [or her] trial."), private communications with the jury
"create a presumption of prejudice."

United

States

v.

Treatman,

524 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir. 1975).

5

The Utah Supreme Court, in State
v. Aikers,
87 Utah 507, 51
P.2d 1052 (Utah 1935), stated:
There is no doubt but that the constitutional right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel is a sacred
right of one accused of crime which may not be
infringed or frittered away, and is one which may not
be denied by a court or be waived by counsel.
Id. at 513, 51 P.2d at 1055.
6

The 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.
16

The trial court, in the instant case, denied Mr. Belt of his
state constitutional right to appear and defend in person at all

,

stages of the trial by denying him the opportunity to be present
at the informal hearing in chambers when the judge dictated and
discussed with counsel the proposed response to the jury's note.
Lee, 585 P.2d at 58 n.l.

In the course of precluding Mr. Belt

from being present in person during the communication between the
i

judge and jury, the trial court did not inform Mr. Belt of the
substance of the proposed communication and thereby failed to
afford him the opportunity to be heard before the supplemental
charge or response was given to the jury.

<

No justification

exists for the trial court's denial of Mr. Belt's constitutional
I
right.
The trial court committed plain error by failing to allow
Mr. Belt's to be present at all stages of the trial.
v. Archambeau,

See

820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

In

State
State

v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court
outlined the following principles involved in determining whether

<

xv

plain error" exists:
In general, to establish the existence of
plain error and to obtain appellate relief
from an alleged error that was not properly
objected to, the appellant must show the
following: (I) An error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
17

(

{

absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
the appellant, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined.
Id.

at 1208-09; see also

State

v.

(Utah Ct. App. 1996); and State v.
App. 1996).

According to State v.

Portillo,
Tenney,
Verde,

914 P.2d 724, 726
913 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct.
770 P.2d 116, 121-22

(Utah 1989), in most circumstances, the term "manifest injustice"
found in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) is synonymous with the "plain
error" standard expressly set forth in Utah Rule of Evidence
103(d).
Based on the plain and well-settled language of article I,
section 12, of the Utah Constitution, Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17 (a), and supporting case law, as discussed herein,
the trial court committed obvious error by failing to allow Mr.
Belt to be present in person during the in-chambers discussion
and decision concerning the communication between the judge and
jury.

In light of the quantum of evidence presented at trial

(See Statement of Facts Nos. 3-6 set forth above), the jury
apparently questioned the culpability of Mr. Belt.

This is

further evinced by the substance of the note delivered to the
judge, which indicates an apparent lack of desire on behalf of
the jury to convict Mr. Belt as charged.
prejudiced.

18

Thus, Mr. Belt was

A.

In State

Any waiver of the constitutional right to be
present at all stages of the trial must
necessarily be voluntary, intentional, and
knowing.
v.

Anderson,

929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996), the Utah

Supreme Court stated that "[a]ny waiver of the right to be
present 'must be voluntary and involve an intentional
relinquishment of a known right.'"
Wagstaff,

Id.

at 1110 (quoting State

772 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).

v.

"To

intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the defendant
must have notice of the proceedings."
v.

McPherson,

Id.

(citing United

421 F.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).

States

Moreover, a

defendant's "absence must be voluntary in the sense that he is
free to attend, not incarcerated elsewhere."
v.

Houtz,

Id.

(citing

State

714 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah 1986)).

In the case at bar, the record reveals that the trial court
failed to provide notice to Mr. Belt of the in-chambers hearing
concerning the communication received from the jury and of the
discussion of and decision to supplementally charge or respond to
the communication of the jury.

By so doing, the trial court

denied Mr. Belt of the constitutionally mandated right to be
present in person at all stages of the trial.

Inasmuch as Mr.

Belt was unaware of the communication between the judge and jury,
he did not voluntarily or intentionally waive the right.

19

B.

The right to be present at all stages of the
trial is further required by Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 17(a) and by Utah case
law.

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 (a) , consistent with
article I, section 12, of the Utah Constitution, requires that
"[i]n all cases the defendant shall
defend in person and by counsel."

have the right to appear and
(Emphasis added).

is also set forth in Utah Supreme Court case law.
Lee,

585 P.2d 58 n.3 (Utah 1978); State

v.

Myers,

This right

See State

v.

28 Utah 2d 254,

255-56, 508 P.2d 41, 42 (Utah 1973) .
Where the language of a rule is plain and unambiguous, the
appellate court will not look beyond the language to determine
its intent.

See, e.g.,

(Utah 1989); Board

of

Brinkerhoff
Educ.

v.

Salt

v. Forsyth,
Lake

779 P.2d 685, 686

County,

659 P.2d 1030,

1035 (Utah 1983) (stating terms of statute should be given an
interpretation and application which is in accord with their
usually accepted meanings'' in holding term "shall" mandatory) .
The term "shall" "is usually presumed mandatory and has been
interpreted as such previously in this and other jurisdictions."
Board
County,
shall

of

Educ,

659 P.2d at 1035; see

also

Herr

v.

Salt

Lake

525 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1974) ("The meaning of the word
is ordinarily that of command."); Webster's Third New

International Dictionary 1085 (1986) (defining "shall" as "used

20

in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is
mandatory").

Because the language of Rule 17(a) is mandatory,

,

the trial court had no discretion to preclude Mr. Belt from being
present in person during the discussion of and decision
concerning the communication between the judge and jury.
The trial court's failure to inform Mr. Belt about the
improper communication with the jury violated Rule 17(m) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

State

3-4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also

Rogers

v. Lucero,
v.

866 P.2d 1,

United

States,

422

U.S. 35, 39, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 2094 (1975) (stating that it was

(

clear that a message from a jury should be answered in open court
after counsel has been informed of its substance and has been
i

given an opportunity to be heard) (citing Shields
States,
States

v.

United

273 U.S. 583, 588-89, 47 S.Ct. 478, 479 (1927));
v. McDuffie,

United

542 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 1976) ("The

procedure is well-established.

When a communication is received

from the jury, counsel should be informed of its substance and
afforded an opportunity to be heard before a supplemental charge
is given.").

{

The manner in which the trial court responded to

the jury's note required it to "enter the question and answer
i

into the record, giving not only" counsel but Mr. Belt "the
opportunity to object to the instruction."
4.

Lucero,

866 P.2d at

By failing to enter the question and answer into the record,
21

{

the trial court violated Rule 17(m) and thereby failed to provide
Mr. Belt the opportunity to object.

Id.;

cf.

State

Anderson,

v.

929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996); Utah Constitution, article I,
section 12.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ENTER THE QUESTION
AND RESPONSE TO THE JURY'S QUESTION DENIED MR.
BELT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS.

Not only did the trial court's improper communication with
the jury deny Mr. Belt of his constitutional right to be present
in person at all stages of the trial, the trial court's failure
also denied Mr. Belt of his constitutional right to due process.7
See Plumb

v. State,

809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990); State

Rawlings,

892 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

ux

v.

Timely and

adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful
way are the very heart of procedural fairness.'"
P.2d at 1069 (quoting Nelson

v.

Jacobsen,

(Utah 1983) (citations omitted)).

UX

Rawlings,

893

669 P.2d 1207, 1211

[A]11 parties are entitled

to notice that a particular issue is being considered by a court
and to an opportunity to present evidence and argument on that
issue before decision.'"
734, 743 (Utah 1990)).

Id.

(quoting Plumb

v. State,

809 P.2d

"The failure to give adequate notice and

7

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no person in a criminal case shall "be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."
22

opportunity to participate can constitute a denial of due process
under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution."8

Plumb,

809 P.2d at 743.

III. BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO MR. BELT'S ABSENCE DURING
THE IN-CHAMBERS HEARING CONCERNING THE PROPOSED
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE JUDGE AND THE JURY#
APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL DEPRIVED MR. BELT OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESENT IN PERSON AT
ALL STAGES OF THE TRIAL AS WELL AS HIS RIGHTS TO
DUE PROCESS AND THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL.
In Strickland

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052

(1984) , the United States Supreme Court established a two-prong
test for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel has been denied.
S.Ct. at 1064.
follows:

Id.

at

687, 104

Utah courts subsequently adopted this test, which

"To prevail, a defendant must show, first, that his

counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's
performance prejudiced the defendant."

Bundy

803, 805 (Utah 1988); see

also

Chacon,

(Utah 1998); accord

v.

1990); State v.

State

Frame,

State
Templin,

v.

v. Deland,

763 P.2d

962 P.2d 48, 50

805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah

723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986); State v.

8

Article I, section 7, of the Utah State Constitution
provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law."
23

Perry,

Wright,

899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) State v.

893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

"[T]he right to the

effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the
accused to receive a fair trial."

Lockhart

v.

Fretwell,

506 U.S.

364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993).
In order to meet the first prong of the test, a defendant
must

nx

identify the acts or omissions' which, under the

circumstances,

x

show that counsel's representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness.'"
(quoting Strickland,

denied,

805 P.2d at 186

466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2066,

2064 (footnotes omitted); see
(quoting Parsons

Templin,

v.

Barnes,

also

Chacon,

962 P.2d at 50

871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah), cert.

513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994)).

A defendant must

"overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered
adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional
judgment."
cert, denied,

State v. Bullock,

791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989),

497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990).

To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different."
Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin,
24

805 P.2d

at 187.

"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome."
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons,
at 405.

Strickland,

466 U.S. at

871 P.2d at 522; Frame,

,

723 P.2d

In the process of arriving at this determination, the

appellate court "should consider the totality of the evidence,
taking into account such factors as whether the errors affect the
• entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how
<

strongly the verdict is supported by the record."
P.2d at 187; see also

State

v. Hovater,

Templin,

805

914 P.2d 37, 39-40 (Utah
i

1996) .
As discussed in detail above, in light of the plain and
well-settled language of article I, section 12, of the Utah
Constitution, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(a) and (m), and
supporting case law, appointed trial counsel's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness by failing to
object to Mr. Belt's absence during the in-chambers discussion
and decision concerning the communication between the judge and
jury.

Appointed trial counsel's failure to object denied Mr.

<

Belt of his constitutional right to be present in person at all
stages of the trial, as well as his constitutional rights to due
i

process and the effective assistance of counsel.

By failing to

so object, appointed trial counsel denied Mr. Belt from that to
which he was entitled, namely, the opportunity to be present in
25

(

person to defend or object concerning the communication with the
jury.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Lynn L. Belt, as Defendant in the
instant case, respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction of Assault by a Prisoner and for such other relief as
the Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances in
this case.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION
Mr. Belt requests oral argument because oral argument will
materially enhance the decisional process due to the novel issues
in the instant appeal dealing with, among other things, the
constitutional right of an accused to be present in person at all
stages of the trial.

These issues present matters requiring

further development in the area of criminal law for the benefit
of both the bar and public.

Counsel for Mr. Belt further

requests that the method of disposition of the instant appeal be

26

by opinion designated "For Official Publication" for purposes of
precedential value and direction in future cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of January, 2000.
OLIT^ WIGGINS, P . C .

-'Wiggins
Attorney£**£or Appellant

(
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT TO
THE UTAH STATE PRISON

VS.

Case No. 971701637 FS
LYNN L. BELT,
Defendant.

That whereas said defendant, having been found guilty of the crime of Assault by a Prisoner,
a felony of the third degree, and now being present in Court accompanied by his attorney and ready
for sentence, thereupon the Court renders its judgment.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
The defendant is sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of 0-5 years.
Court recommendations: None
Dated July 17, 1998, with the Seal of the Court affixed hereto.
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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Trial Case No. 971701637
Court of Appeals No. 981688

vs.
LYNN L. BELT,
Defendant.

AUGUST 27, 1999 HEARING
BEFORE

THE HONORABLE DARWIN C. HANSEN

ORIGINAL
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
Certified Court Transcriber
652 Jefferson Cove
Sandy, Utah 84070
801-567-1157

FILED
DEC 1 5 1999
COURT OF APPEALS

ItikteAei

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

DAVID M. COLE
Davis County Attorney
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025

For the Defendant:

SCOTT L. WIGGINS
Arnold & Wiggins
57 West 200 South, #104
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
801-328-4333
* * *

August 27, 1999
HONORABLE DARWIN C. HANSEN PRESIDING
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

The matter before the Court today is the State of Utah
against Lynn L. Belt.

Let me indicate there are two

numbers that I want to make a part of the record in this
case.

The case is now on appeal and when it was in the

Court below, the trial court, my court, it was Case No.
971701637.

This same case is before the Court of Appeals

with the Court of Appeals No. 981688. And I understand the
status of the case is that a motion was filed by the State
in the Court of Appeals asking that the matter be, that the
record of the matter be supplemented and according to the
Minute Entry from the Court of Appeals, that motion was
granted by stipulation from the defendant and the matter
was thereupon remanded back to the Court to supplement the
record on appeal, specifically the issue, according to the
Minute Entry, is for the Court to prepare findings of fact
concerning the nature and content of the trial court's
discussions with counsel and the jury with respect to the
jury note which was given by the jury during the period of
deliberation.
With that explanation and for the record, let me
have counsel make an appearance and at the same time let me
1

1

also indicate that defendant Lynn Belt is present here in

2

this hearing.

3

So, Mr. Cole, will you proceed?

4

MR. COLE:

5

David Cole from the Davis County

Attorney's Office for the State.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. WIGGINS:

8

Thank you.
Scott L. Wiggins on behalf of Mr.

Belt, your Honor.

9

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Wiggins. And I

10

understand, gentlemen, that there is a written stipulation

11

in this matter, is that correct?

12

MR. WIGGINS:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. COLE:

15

MR. WIGGINS:

Kind of.

Okay.
If I might advise the Court.
If I might, as well.

Your Honor,

16

just as a bit of correction and I might be nitpicking here

17

but we did not stipulate to the motion to supplement the

18

record.

19

not stipulated.

20

We did not oppose it on certain grounds but it was
We did file a response to that.

THE COURT:

Okay.

The Minute Entry will be that

21

Belt has no objection to the motions being granted and that

22

is different than a stipulation.

23

Mr. Wiggins.

24

MR. WIGGINS:

25

MR. COLE:

So, I appreciate that,

Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, there are two issues for
2

the Court and I should probably provide the Court some
background quickly and, counsel, feel free to jump in if
you need to,
I discussed what occurred with respect to the
note that was sent to the Court during jury deliberations
with both defense counsel at trial and the prosecutor at
trial.

The prosecutor was Mel Wilson, defense counsel was

Laura Thompson.

I've discussed with them extensively what

their recollection is of what occurred.
Counsel and I have talked this morning about I
drafted a stipulation based on what information I had as of
yesterday.

We've made a few adjustments to that

stipulation this morning.

There is one additional question

that we have for the Court. We would probably simply ask
the Court to make a record of the Court's recollection on
that issue.

Other than that, we have a very straight

forward stipulation.

We can simply provide an oral

statement of what that is and I'll provide my notes to the
Court if you want or we can provide the written findings of
fact in accordance with the stipulation, however the Court
wants to do that.
THE COURT:

If it's agreeable with counsel, I

think I'd like to have you give me the verbal stipulation
but I'd like it followed up with a written stipulation
signed by both counsel.
3

1

MR. COLE:

And it's drafted to the point where I

2

can simply go to the office and counsel and I can sit down

3

and sign it and give it to the Court before we leave today.

4

THE COURT:

And I take it that your discussion

5

with Mr. Wilson and with Ms. Thompson in terms of what

6

happened, Mr Wiggins has been a part of that and is fully

7

aware of what they would testify to if they were called as

8

witnesses.

9

MR. COLE:

My understanding is that Mr. Wiggins

10

has talked with Laura Thompson previous to this.

11

accurate?

12

MR. WIGGINS:

Yes, yes.

Is that

I've talked to her on

13

the phone a couple of times about it, your Honor.

However,

14

I'm a little bit in the dark about what the testimony would

15

actually be to be quite honest with you.

16

initially, when he called me prior to filing his motion to

17

supplement the record, indicated some representations that

18

were going to be made by Mr. Wilson concerning an

19

in-chambers conference that was not part of his motion and

20

for whatever reason—I was hoping he was going to be here

21

today—but for whatever reason he pulled that from his

22

affidavit that he drafted for Mr. Wilson, so I was somewhat

23

puzzled by that.

24

factual scenario consequentially or sequentially leading up

25

to that but I don't think I can agree as far as knowing

Mr. Verhoef

We can probably clear that up by way of a

4

1

that that's what they're going to testify to.

2

MR. COLE:

Let me clarify, your Honor.

What

3

happened, what is at issue is whether, essentially whether

4

or not counsel was present and had input into the Court's

5

decision to send a response back to the jury.

6

question according to Mr. Wilson or to Ms. Thompson that

7

the Court made contact.

8

stipulation is and I think it will become clear to the

9

Court why I don't think it's an issue. Mr. Wilson and Ms.

There is no

And I'll tell you what our

10

Thompson are both here today.

If there is any question,

11

they're here in the building.

We can get them and get any

12

clarification that counsel needs.

13

What we proposed to stipulate to is the

14

following: During jury deliberations in the matter of State

15

v. Lynn Belt, the fore person sent a note to Judge Hansen

16

desiring to know "what was Mr. Belt in jail for".

17

was given to the bailiff and I believe it was Deputy Brown.

18

Is that accurate?

19
20

THE COURT:

Deputy Kevin Brown.

The note

He was the

bailiff.

21

MR. COLE:

Who took it immediately to Judge

22

Hansen.

Deputy Brown did not discuss the note or the case

23

with jury members.

24

hearing in chambers and asked the parties to be present.

25

Melvin Wilson was present in person representing the State.

Judge Hansen convened an informal

5

1

Laura Thompson was present via telephone representing the

2

defendant who was not present.

3

was Glenda Pitman, Judge Hansen's clerk.

4

THE COURT:

And I believe also present

Not a Glenda Pitman.

Is that accurate?
It's Laura Ann

5

Attanisco, A-T-T-A-N-I-S-C-O.

6

MR. COLE:

7

THE COURT:

A-T-T-A-N-I-S-C-O, I believe.

8

THE CLERK:

C-I-O.

9

MR. COLE: A-S-C-I-O.

10

THE COURT:

Would you spell that one more time?

A-S-C-I-O.

And not as part of this stipulation

11

but for the benefit of both counsel, this case was tried in

12

Layton.

13

and was part of the trial.

14

Laura Ann Attinascio was my lead clerk in Layton

MR. COLE:

Okay.

Anyway, she was also present.

15

The proceedings were not recorded.

16

the response to the jury that read "The reason Mr. Belt was

17

in jail is irrelevant.

18

deliberations based on the testimony presented in the

19

courtroom.

20

Judge Hansen drafted

Please proceed with your

Darwin C. Hansen, District Court Judge."

Counsel for both the State and the defendant agreed

21

that the language in the response were appropriate and note

22

that Judge Hansen's response were returned to the jury by

23

Deputy Brown who did not discuss the note or it's contents

24

with jury members.

25

The only other additional question and
6

supplementation of the record that I think counsel and I
feel would be appropriate is for the Court to indicate if
there was a particular reason that the proceedings were not
recorded or if that was simply an oversight on everyone's
part or if it was standard practice of the Court.

Just a

clarification as to the reasoning why it was not recorded
and I was not there and I don't know.

It's been my

experience that in many courts they are not recorded.

It's

been counsel's experience that they are recorded in all
courts and so we don't know what the answer to that is and
Ms. Thompson and Mr. Wilson could not clarify that.

So

we've asked for that clarification from the Court.
But other than that the facts seem to be very
straight forward and we believe, after talking with Ms.
Thompson, Mr. Wilson, and counsel that this probably covers
everything that we need from the perspective of the Court
of Appeals.
THE COURT: Mr. Wiggins?
MR. WIGGINS:

Your Honor, I believe that's

accurate and I don't want to appear in anyway to be
disrespectful to the Court.
THE COURT:

You won't be.

MR. WIGGINS:

We're merely trying to do as the

Court of Appeals has asked us to do.

I would have one

follow-up inquiry and that would be as to why the defendant
7

1

wasn't present as well.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. WIGGINS:

4

All right.
Asked to be present during that

communication.

5

THE COURT:

All right.

Both questions are fair

6

questions and let me even go one step further.

My

7

recollection of the course of events is as set forth in the

8

stipulation.

9

present, it was my judgment.

The reason that the defendant was not
And the defendant was in the

10

holding cell at the time because the jury was in

11

deliberation.

12

left a telephone number where she could be reached.

13

not reconvene court in the courtroom on this matter because

14

I thought it inappropriate to have the defendant come in

15

without counsel being present and, therefore, did not do

16

that.

17

Ms. Thompson had left the courthouse but

We got Laura Thompson on the telephone.

I did

Wilson

18

was on the telephone.

19

outlined the question and the appropriate response.

20

appropriate response was agreed upon.

21

the paper not by me but by Laura Attinascio as I dictated

22

to her.

23

name District Court Judge.

24

bailiff and he returned it to the jury.

25

We discussed as the stipulation
The

It was written on

I then signed the document and wrote underneath my
Then I gave the note to the

Why it wasn't recorded is a judgment of the
8

Court.

The telephone was such that it could have been

recorded magnetically on magnetic tape.

That was the only

recording we had in Layton. My conclusion was that the
note in terms of the question and in terms of the response
spoke for itself and the note indicated that the jury, the
question and the answer were such that it seemed to be
implicit that the jury was not called into the jury room
and, therefore, we simply had a conversation and gave it
back to the bailiff so the jury could continue
deliberations without undue delay waiting for Laura
Thompson to come back to the Court.

That's probably a

misjudgment on the Court's part and hereafter I'll record
them.

It's that simple.
MR. WIGGINS: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. COLE:

I think that takes care of all the

questions we have.
MR. WIGGINS:
Was just to clarify.
this.

One more follow up (inaudible).

Again, I'm a little bit foggy on

So, Mr. Wilson was on the telephone as well from his

office.

It was a conference call?
THE COURT:

chambers.

No, no. Mr. Wilson was in my

I'm on the telephone and the telephone is on the

speaker.
MR. WIGGINS:
THE COURT:

Okay.

So Mr. Wilson can hear.
9

1

MR. WIGGINS :

2

THE COURT:

All right.

And also can spe>ak.

And I called

3

Laura Thompson on the telephone.

4

Wilson and we have the conversation via telephone with Mr.

5

Wilson and myself in chambers on the speaker phone and

6

Laura Thompson, wherever she was, we had the telephone

7

number.

8

else.

9
10
11
12
13

I don't know if that was her office or somewhere

MR. COLE:

I believe it was actually her cell

phone.
MR. WIGGINS:

I think she was at a cell phone and

she was at a burger, I don't know if that's relevant.
MR. COLE:

She was on her way to get something to

14

eat is what I had heard.

15

she was on a cell phone.

16

She can hear me and Mr.

THE COURT:

And I don't know the details but

And the reason we went ahead and the

17

reason I did not want to delay and wait until she returned

18

is because I wanted to get the answer back to the jury so

19

the jury could continue deliberation.

20

an expedient way to do it and that the note would speak for

21

itself and in retrospect, clearly that telephone conference

22

should have been recorded.

23

I thought that was

No doubt about it.

MR. WIGGINS: Were there any discussions by

24

counsel and the Court about supplemental instructions as a

25

follow-up to the response, your Honor.
10

1

THE COURT:

There were not.

It was my judgment

2

that the instructions were sufficient.

It was my judgment

3

that the issue as to why Mr. Belt was in jail was

4

irrelevant and to belabor that point with specifics with a

5

jury in my judgment I think would have, well, it would have

6

had no probative value and it very well may have been

7

significantly prejudicial to the defendant.

8

403 I didn't think there was any reason at all for that to

9

come in. And so I simply instructed Ms. Attinascio to

And under Rule

10

write the response which was agreed upon by both counsel.

11

Then I signed it and we gave it to the bailiff and the

12

bailiff returned it to the jury.

13

MR. COLE:

And that's it.

Would the Court like me to redo the

14

stipulation as indicated?

15

the Court has provided I should put in the stipulation.

16

What I thought we'd do is stipulate to these facts and

17

allow the Court to supplement this with the indications

18

you've had in response to the two follow-up question

19

counsel made.

20

provide findings of fact, if you want counsel to do it, if

21

you want to do them yourself.

22

handle that procedurally.

23

look at them before they're signed as to form at least.

24

But other than that I'm at the Court's pleasure.

25

I'm not sure how much of what

Then we, I don't know if you want me to

MR. WIGGINS:

You tell us how you want to

I think that everyone should

Did you have in there?

I can't
11

1

remember we talked back in the back but did you have in

2

there that Ms. Thompson couldn't recall -

3

MR. COLE:

No, I did not.

4

MR. WIGGINS:

5

MR. COLE: Ms. Thompson's indication was she

—

her recollection.

6

recalls the telephone conversation with the Court.

7

recalls that she agreed that that was an appropriate

8

response when it was read to her.

9

knowing that Mr. Wilson was there.

She

She doesn't recall
I got the impression in

10

talking with her that she thought, her recollection now is

11

that she was talking just with the Court.

12

remember having heard Mr. Wilson on the speaker phone.

13

Fair enough?

14

THE COURT:

She doesn't

I don't know if it helps but there is

15

no doubt that Mr. Wilson was on the phone and I wouldn't

16

call and talk with plaintiff's counsel, I wouldn't call and

17

talk with the defense counsel by herself without the

18

prosecution being on the telephone, nor would I do it in

19

the reverse order.

20

MR. WIGGINS:

21

any question that did not occur.

22

hearing Mr. Wilson's voice. And that may have be because

23

she was in a burger joint, you know.

24
25

THE COURT:

Yeah, and I don't think there is
She just doesn't remember

Who knows.

So -

I'm glad you're here to defend

yourself, Ms. Thompson.

The record may reflect that Ms.
12

Laura Thompson just came in the courtroom.
MR. COLE:

What I think we'll do if the Court

pleasure is okay with this is that we'll walk to my office
and fix the stipulation and sign it.

Counsel and I will

make sure that it's accurate to counsel's recollection.
Then we'll ask that the Court supplement that in making
findings.

Do you want me to draft findings and then the

Court can amend them?

How would you like to (inaudible).

MR. WIGGINS:

If I just might make a suggestion

and maybe the Court obviously will do what it wants with it
but maybe what we do, is this is going to need to be
transcribed anyway for purposes of going back up on appeal.
Maybe if we transcribe it as quickly as possible then why
don't we draft the findings of fact from that?
MR. COLE:

That would work.

MR. WIGGINS: And if we can do it in a
stipulation form with both counsel signing off on it as the
Court would desire and then —
THE COURT:

And then myself signing it confirming

the findings.
MR. WIGGINS: Right.
THE COURT:

Would that make sense?

MR. WIGGINS: Right.
THE COURT:

And then include in the findings all

of the necessary information that both counsel believe is
13

1

appropriate in light of the nature of this appeal based

2

upon the transcript of this hearing and based upon the

3

stipulation of the specific facts that occurred that you

4

just mentioned.

5

MR. COLE:

Yes. And I think actually if counsel,

6

that's a great idea, Scott.

7

together then there won't be any question that we've

8

included both the stipulation we've indicated today and the

9

Court's responses to the questions.

10
11
12

If counsel and I do it

MR. WIGGINS: Let's do it that way, counsel.
That's good.
THE COURT:

And then put a confirmation statement

13

for the Court's signature at the end of those findings.

14

We'll make them part of the file and then I'll instruct the

15

clerk to transmit this file.

16

file to the clerk here in our office and then she can

17

follow the appropriate procedure and send it back to the

18

Court of Appeals and I'm sure that that transcript will,

19

you will want it to be a part of this file.

Well, I will simply give this

20

MR. WIGGINS:

21

THE COURT:

22

gentlemen are going to prepare.

23

MR. COLE:

Correct.

Together with the findings that you

The last thing that we'd ask the Court

24

to do is order that the tape be transcribed.

25

have to receive an order from the Court.

Typically we

If you'd just do
14

that orally now we can probably get that process moved
along quickly.

I know counsel has, would like to see that

done quickly and so would I for that matter.
THE COURT:

So ordered.

And if you need a

written order, prepare one and I will sign it.
MR. COLE:
THE COURT:
MR. COLE:

We'll do that, your Honor.
All right. Anything else, gentlemen?
I don't believe so.

MR. WIGGINS: No.
THE COURT:

Thank you very much.

I want to say,

make one other comment.
Mr. Wiggins, I appreciate you being here.
MR. WIGGINS:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

And I'm glad that you're a part of it

and your comment about the Court, don't worry about that at
all.

A full and complete record needs to be made with the

Court of Appeals for their review.
recorded.

This ought to have been

It wasn't and all us learn from our

indiscretions in the past and I can assure you it won't
happen again.
MR. WIGGINS:

Thank you, your Honor.

Appreciate

it.
THE COURT:
MR. COLE:

Thank you.
Thank you, Judge, we'll do that as

quickly as we can.
15

THE COURT:

Thank you.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.)

16
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Davis County Attorney1s Office
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-4300

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT

:

vs.
LYNN L. BELT,

:

Defendant.

Case No. 971701637

:

The parties came before the Court on the 27th day of August,
1999, for hearing on the State's request for clarification of the
record.

The Court, having reviewed the file and taken statements

and argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised,
hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

During the first stages of the July 17, 1998, jury

deliberations in the matter of State v. Belt, the foreperson sent
a note to the Court desiring to know "What was Mr. Belt in jail
fore (sic)".
2.

The note was given to bailiff Kevin Brown, who took

it immediately to the Court.
3.

Deputy Brown did not discuss the note or the case

with jury members.

4.

The Court convened an informal hearing in chambers

with Melvin C. Wilson, in person, as counsel for the State, Laura
K. Thompson, via cellular telephone, as counsel for Defendant,
and Lara-Anne Attaniscio, Judge Hansen's law clerk.
5.

The Defendant was not present during the informal

hearing in chambers even though he was in a holding cell at the
time.
6.

The informal hearing in chambers was not recorded

even though it could have been recorded by magnetic tape.
7.

During the informal hearing in chambers, the Court

used the speaker phone so that all in chambers could hear each
others' comments.
8. Ms. Thompson recalls speaking with the court via
telephone and agreeing that the Court's proposed response was
appropriate, but does not recall knowing that Mr. Wilson was
present in the Court's chambers.
9.

The Court dictated and proposed a response to the

jury that read, "The reason Mr. Belt was in jail is irrelevant.
Please proceed with your deliberations based on the testimony
presented in the courtroom."

The Court signed the note, "Darwin

C. Hansen, District Court Judge."
10.

Counsel for both the state and the Defendant, who

was not present, agreed that the language and response were
appropriate.

11.

The note and the Court's response were returned to

the jury by Deputy Brown, who did not discuss the note or its
contents with jury members.
12.

No supplemental jury instructions were given. It

was the Court's judgement that an instruction would unduly
belabor an irrelevant point, to the Defendant's detriment.
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